Jeffreys, M. (2006) Natural-language 'cheap talk' enables coordination on a social-dilemma game in a culturally homogeneous population. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Evolution of Language , pages 145--151.

Jeffreys, M. (2006) Natural-language 'cheap talk' enables coordination on a social-dilemma game in a culturally homogeneous population. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Evolution of Language, pages 145--151.

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