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Abstract

We investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked by cheaters. In such a system, signal use fluctuates in time and space and hence the meaning of a given signal is not constant. When the temptation to cheat is too large, no honest communication can maintain itself in a Tower of Babel of many signals. We discuss our analysis in the light of the Green Beard mechanism for the evolution of altruism.

Keywords: Evolution, Communication, Language, Cooperation, Conflict, Green Beards

@article{baalen03commonLanguage,
  author={Minus van Baalen and Vincent A. A. Jansen},
  title={Common language or Tower of Babel? On the evolutionary dynamics of signals and their meanings},
  journal={Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},
  year={2003},
  month={January},
  volume={270},
  number={1510},
  pages={69-76},
  doi={10.1098/rspb.2002.2151},
  url={http://groups.lis.illinois.edu/amag/langev/paper/baalen03commonLanguage.html},
  keywords={Evolution, Communication, Language, Cooperation, Conflict, Green Beards}
}